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My purpose in this brief essay is to present a critique of 
the Supreme Court's ruling, to be found in various of 
its bank merger decisions, that commercial banking is a 
line of commerce. That phrase line of commerce ap-
pears in Section 7 of the Clayton Act, one of our two 
basic antitrust statutes, and no doubt that explains why 
the Court has persisted in using it and why, despite the 
awkwardness of the expression, commentators have 
too. But a line of commerce is a product market, and 
there is more to any such market than a group of 
producers. Indeed, it is not possible to identify the 
producers of a particular market without first having 
identified products and, if perhaps only to determine 
geographical boundaries, the buyers of those products. 
Where a merger is at issue, though, who the producers 
are is crucial, and it is clear how the Court's cryptically 
put judgment, that commercial banking is a line of 
commerce, should be read: in any bank merger case the 
relevant producers are the commercial banks of the 
appropriate geographical area, whatever it may be; or, 
in yet other words, the proposed merger of any two 
commercial banks is to be judged by how it affects the 
market shares of the commercial banks of the appro-
priate area. 
In appraising the Supreme Court's judgment, I pay 
particular attention to its 1974 decision in the Con-
necticut National Bank case.
1 That decision, although 
handed down more than six years ago, is still our most 
•The author wrote an earlier paper on the same subject which appeared in 
Commercial banking as a line of commerce, a study done by Carter H. 
Golembe Associates, Inc., and published by the Association of Bank Holding 
Companies (Washington, D.C., 1981). This article is a substantially altered 
version of that paper. 
recent observation on its thinking about mergers of 
commercial banks. It is not a model of either clarity or 
completeness. But as I suggest in the first section of this 
paper, what the Court seems to have argued was that 
Connecticut commercial banks of the early 1970s were 
not specialty shops but department stores, indeed, the 
only department stores of finance, and that commercial 
banking was therefore a line of commerce. My conten-
tion, elaborated in the second section, is that the argu-
ment is a non sequitur. There may well be advantage in 
being a department store of finance, or in providing a 
unique cluster of products. The actual extent of the 
advantage can be revealed, though, only by an investi-
gation of what is going on in the real world. So the 
Court should have investigated, or directed the district 
court to investigate again, what was going on in Con-
necticut, and not in some ill-defined single market for 
commercial bank products, but rather in each of several 
different markets in which commercial banks were op-
erating. It did not, and that is why it must be faulted for 
its line-of-commerce judgment. 
The world of commercial banks is very different 
now from what it was in 1974, in part because the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 was added to our statute books. 
As many have observed, that act is extremely far-
reaching, and in the last section of this paper I comment 
briefly on what it means for bank mergers. It is, I argue, 
of immediate relevance, since it eliminates legal bar-
riers to entry into certain markets for depository insti-
'United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). 
7 tutions other than commercial banks; and it hardly 
matters that some of those other depository institutions 
may for years remain only potential competitors of 
commercial banks. 
How the Supreme Court 
Came to View Banking as Unique 
In 1973, the district court considered a Department of 
Justice challenge to a proposed merger of two com-
mercial banks, Connecticut National Bank and First 
New Haven National Bank.
2 It ruled against the De-
partment of Justice and, interestingly enough, main-
tained that savings banks had to be included, along 
with commercial banks, among the relevant producers. 
Connecticut savings and commercial banks were, it 
said, in some degree "fierce competitors" (p. 280). 
There was "meaningful competition" between the two 
kinds of banks in the provision of a variety of products. 
When the decision was appealed, however, the Su-
preme Court overruled the district court. It found, as it 
had previously, that commercial banking was a line of 
commerce. The question is how the Supreme Court 
came to its judgment that, in Connecticut during the 
early 1970s, commercial banking was a line of com-
merce. 
It appears to be widely accepted that the Supreme 
Court's Connecticut National decision followed from 
its 1963 decision in the Philadelphia National Bank 
case,
3 but that, I believe, can reasonably be disputed. 
The line-of-commerce arguments of the two decisions 
would appear to be different. 
In its Philadelphia National decision, the Supreme 
Court argued in what seems to me a straightforward 
way. I do not say that it was convincing, but only that it 
proceeded as economics suggests it should have. It 
considered separately, one at a time, a variety of the 
more important different products provided by com-
mercial banks and for each gave a reason why in pro-
viding it commercial banks were sufficiently insulated 
from competition. To quote from the Philadelphia Na-
tional decision (pp. 356—57): 
Some commercial banking products or services are so 
distinctive that they are entirely free of effective compe-
tition from products or services of other financial insti-
tutions; the checking account is in this category. Others 
enjoy such cost advantages as to be insulated within a 
broad range from substitutes furnished by other institu-
tions. . . . Finally, there are banking facilities which, 
although in terms of cost and price they are freely com-
petitive with the facilities provided by other financial insti-
tutions, nevertheless enjoy a settled consumer preference, 
insulating them, to a marked degree, from competition; 
this seems to be the case with savings deposits. 
In that instance, then, commercial banking was a line 
of commerce because, for a variety of reasons and over 
a range of different products, commercial banks were 
not really confronted by genuine competitors. 
Surprisingly perhaps, the Supreme Court did not go 
on at great length about line of commerce in its Phila-
delphia National decision. Besides the above-quoted 
passage, there is hardly more than one other dealing 
with line of commerce (p. 356): 
We have no difficulty in determining the "line of com-
merce" (relevant product or services market). . . . We 
agree with the District Court that the cluster of products 
(various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking 
accounts and trust administration) denoted by the term 
"commercial banking" . . . composes a distinct line of 
commerce. 
What the district court had said in this case
4 was that 
"[commercial banks are the only institutions autho-
rized to receive demand deposits," or, in words it might 
better have used, that they are the only institutions 
authorized to provide payments services, and further, 
that they "offer a wider variety of services than any 
other financial institutions." Commercial banks, it not-
ed, "have often been termed the department stores of 
finance" (p. 360). Its argument apparently was that, 
being department stores of finance, commercial banks 
were by themselves a line of commerce. There is some 
substantiation of that in the following passage taken 
from the district court's decision (p. 363): 
It is the conglomeration of all the various services and 
functions that sets the commercial bank off from other 
financial institutions. Each item is an integral part of the 
whole, almost every one of which is dependent upon and 
would not exist but for the other. . . .
5 
2United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (1973). 
3United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
4United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (1962). 
That second sentence is blatantly false and best forgotten. At the time of 
the decision, neither savings banks nor savings and loan associations could 
legally provide payments services. So if that sentence were true, there would 
have been no savings banks or savings and loan associations in existence. 
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It is one thing, though, to say, as the district court 
evidently did in its Philadelphia National decision, that 
commercial banks were department stores of finance, 
and therefore, taken together, a line of commerce. It is 
something else to say, as the Supreme Court did in its 
Philadelphia National decision, only that the cluster of 
products being provided by commercial banks was a 
line of commerce. In its Philadelphia National decision 
the Supreme Court seems to have found commercial 
banking to be a line of commerce not because commer-
cial banks were (the only) department stores of finance, 
but because in the provision of many important prod-
ucts they were not facing genuine competition, except 
maybe from each other. 
In its Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Com-
pany decision,
6 however, the Supreme Court did bless 
the district court's line-of-commerce argument that 
commercial banking was a line of commerce because 
commercial banks were department stores of finance. 
And looking back from 1974, it appears a good thing 
that it did. In 1974, more than a decade after it had 
handed down its Philadelphia National decision, and 
with its collective eye on Connecticut rather than Penn-
sylvania, it could not maintain that, with regard to 
savings deposits, commercial banks enjoyed a settled 
consumer preference. In its Connecticut National de-
cision it conceded that the district court had been in 
part right in its observation that savings and commer-
cial banks competed fiercely: "[W]e have no doubt on 
[the] record that savings banks and commercial banks 
are 'fierce competitors'... to the degree that they offer 
identical or essentially fungible services" (p. 662). But 
as I indicated, it had blessed the district court's Phila-
delphia National argument in its Phillipsburg National 
decision, and in its Connecticut National decision it 
quoted the relevant passage from that decision (p. 664): 
Philadelphia Bank emphasized that it is the cluster of 
products and services that full-service banks offer that as a 
matter of trade reality makes commercial banking a dis-
tinct line of commerce. Commercial banks are the only 
financial institutions in which a wide variety of financial 
products and services — some unique to commercial 
banking and others not—are gathered together in one 
place. The clustering of financial products and services in 
banks facilitates convenient access to them for all banking 
customers. 
That is quite a clear statement: Commercial banks 
provide a broader range of products than do any of the 
other differently designated financial institutions; they 
provide most if not all of those provided by other insti-
tutions and some that the others do not (cannot) pro-
vide. They are truly the department stores of finance, 
and that is why they are special and, taken together, a 
line of commerce. 
A Basis in Law 
The Supreme Court's Connecticut National decision is 
to be distinguished, though, from its Phillipsburg Na-
tional decision. In the Connecticut decision the Court 
put more stress than it had in the Phillipsburg decision 
on the legal authority of commercial banks. Thus, it 
took notice of a recently enacted Connecticut statute
7 
and pointedly remarked on what that statute did not 
authorize. Savings banks, it said, would soon be able to 
provide payments services to individuals but not to 
business customers (pp. 665-66): 
The state statute empowering savings banks to offer de-
mand deposits forbids those banks from marketing the 
service to anyone "for the purpose of, or in connection 
with, the carrying on of any business, trade, occupation or 
profession." . . . Thus, under the new act, savings banks 
will be restricted to offering personal checking accounts. 
So, even under the new statute, Connecticut commer-
cial banks would still be unique. They would still be, 
taken together, a line of commerce. To quote again 
from the Connecticut National decision (p. 664): 
Despite the strides that savings banks in [Connecticut] 
have made toward parity with commercial banks, the latter 
continue to be able to provide a cluster of services that the 
former cannot, particularly with regard to commercial 
customers, and this Court has repeatedly held that it is the 
unique cluster of services provided by commercial banks 
that sets them apart for purposes of [Section] 7 [of the 
Clayton Act]. (Emphasis added,) 
And had legal restrictions not seemed important to the 
Court, it presumably would not have used the word 
cannot. The words do not would have been more ap-
propriate. 
In stressing the legal authority of commercial banks, 
the Supreme Court was (as young folks used to say) 
'United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 
(1970). 
Connecticut Public Act 73-195 (May 14, 1973). 
9 right on. For a successful antitrust challenge to a mer-
ger, past or proposed, barriers to entry are of the es-
sence. If there are none, then the notion that the merger 
poses any threat to competition is pure fantasy. And a 
legal restriction such as that cited by the Court in its 
Connecticut National decision is, pure and simple, a 
barrier to entry. 
Even though not all statutes are effective, there still 
is a big difference between an appeal to history, to who 
has been producing what, and an appeal to legal re-
strictions on entry. Where a merger is at issue, who has 
been producing what has no necessary implications. 
Imagine that there are two companies and that all 
along they have been the only producers of some par-
ticular product. They have decided to merge, and the 
question is whether they ought to be allowed to go 
ahead. By itself, the fact that they are and have long 
been the only producers is not compelling. It may 
always have been easy to get into their business. Other 
companies may have stayed out simply because, with 
the two of them producing, there was no money to be 
made in their business. 
In its Connecticut National decision the Supreme 
Court did observe, as it had in prior decisions, that 
some products were being provided by commercial 
banks alone (p. 665): 
[T]he commercial bank-loan business in Connecticut is 
controlled almost exclusively by commercial banks. 
Moreover, commercial banks in the State offer credit-card 
plans, loans for securities purchases, trust services, com-
puter and account services, and letters of credit. Savings 
banks do not. 
That, however, is not a very revealing or helpful obser-
vation. Savings banks may not have been providing 
some or all of the listed products because there was no 
profit incentive for them to do so. If that is the expla-
nation, they may still have been, in a very real sense, 
competitors of commercial banks in the markets for 
those products. But the Court did make an undeniably 
material point when it noted that Connecticut savings 
banks were by law prevented from providing payments 
services to commercial customers. 
The intent of the Court, though, in stressing the legal 
authority of Connecticut commercial banks, seems only 
to have been to establish that they provided a broader 
range of products than any other differently designated 
financial institutions: Again, its argument was in es-
sence this: there were some products that by law only 
commercial banks could provide; and since commercial 
banks provided most, if not all, of the products provided 
by the other institutions, theirs was the broadest range 
of products, a unique cluster of products. 
There remains the question, to which I now turn, of 
how the Supreme Court got from its observation that 
Connecticut commercial banks were providing a unique 
cluster of products to its conclusion that commercial 
banking was a line of commerce. 
Why Banking Can Be Unique 
and Still Not Be a Line of Commerce 
It very well may be that there is advantage, a general-
ized advantage, extending to all other products, in being 
able to provide some products that by law others can-
not. So far as I know, there are no analyses of the 
possibility to be found in the economics literature.
8 But 
it is not inconsistent with postwar history. Why have 
savings banks and savings and loan associations been 
allowed to pay more interest than commercial banks on 
certain kinds of liabilities? And why have savings bank 
and savings and loan association officials labored so to 
preserve their interest rate advantage? 
Nor is it difficult to think up reasons why Connecti-
cut commercial banks of the early 1970s, being able to 
provide products that differently designated financial 
institutions could not, were therefore at a competitive 
advantage in the provision of other of their products. In 
providing payments services, commercial banks may 
have acquired information about their customers, in-
formation that they were able to make good use of 
when the customers changed hats and showed up as 
would-be borrowers. The provision of payments ser-
vices could also have given advantage in the marketing 
of other products. It does not hurt to be well-known. 
8Commercial bank loan and investment policy (Urbana, 111.: University 
of Illinois, 1963), by Donald R. Hodgman, a book which appeared after the 
district court's Philadelphia National decision and before the Supreme Court's, 
does not contain such an analysis. History has overtaken Hodgman, but 
his essential point was that commercial banks, because they alone provide 
payments services (or demand deposits), are unlike "institutional investors." 
Allegedly, they have a different portfolio strategy and, in their lending, a 
different pricing policy. Perhaps, but being different is not the same as having a 
competitive advantage. And Hodgman does not explain in any detail why 
commercial banks, having "a virtual monopoly on the services which institute 
the national payments mechanism" (p. 170), are (or were) therefore at an 
advantage in the provision of other products. He may not have believed this, 
although he does seem to have argued for commercial banking as a line of 
commerce (pp. 169-73). 
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But what the Supreme Court emphasized in its 
Connecticut National decision was the convenience of 
one-stop shopping: "The clustering of financial prod-
ucts and services in [commercial] banks facilitates 
convenient access to them for all banking customers" 
(p. 664). And convenience explains the existence of 
supermarkets and department stores and shopping 
malls. That being so, it is certainly reasonable that in 
the early 1970s Connecticut and other commercial 
banks were able to trade on the relatively great con-
venience that only they could offer. 
It does not follow, though, that commercial banking 
was therefore a line of commerce, whether in Con-
necticut or elsewhere, unless commercial banks were 
insulated from competition even in the provision of 
products also provided by differently designated finan-
cial institutions. Suppose that there are two ordinary 
department stores located very near. The first carries, 
say, 100 different products, and the second carries that 
100 and another 10. The two stores are, so to say, in 
the same business. But who would argue that the second 
can charge whatever it wants for any of the 100 prod-
ucts carried by both stores? Having that additional 10 
products, making one-stop shopping more nearly pos-
sible, may give some market power. But how much 
power is something to be determined empirically. Ex-
cessive market power, or overwhelming competitive 
advantage, simply does not follow as a matter of logic 
from providing greater convenience. 
My example may appear too contrived. I have not 
explained why the first store does not carry those other 
10 products. It is possible, though, to invoke a legal 
barrier to entry, as the Supreme Court did in its Con-
necticut National decision. But again, convenience, 
like most other things, is worth only so much. (And 
what it is worth may be offset, either in part or com-
pletely, by the cost of providing it.) In giving conve-
nience, the provider does not get a license to steal. The 
shopping strategy that appears most attractive at one 
configuration of prices will not appear so at another. So 
what if Connecticut commercial banks, protected by 
law, were in the early 1970s providing the broadest 
range of products? The Supreme Court should not 
have concluded, as a matter of logic, that savings banks 
were therefore to be excluded from the line of com-
merce. The presumption that there is sufficient compe-
titive advantage in providing convenience should have 
been checked against what was going on in Connecti-
cut. It is of decided relevance that, as was pointed out 
above, the Supreme Court accepted in part the district 
court's finding of fact: "[W]e have no doubt on [the] 
record that savings banks and commercial banks are 
'fierce competitors' ... to the degree that they offer 
identical or essentially fungible services" (p. 662). 
Banks compete in more than one market 
It is most perplexing. In its Connecticut National deci-
sion the Supreme Court did accept, if only in part, the 
district court's finding of fierce competition. Yet, un-
deterred, it found that commercial banking was a line 
of commerce (p. 663): 
As the District Court put it in another context, it would be 
"ostrich-like" ... to assume that the two types of banks 
[commercial and savings] are not in direct and vigorous 
competition with regard to the services they share or are 
not viewed by many bank customers as more or less 
fungible for purposes of those services. . . . That savings 
and commercial banks are direct competitors in some 
submarkets, however, is not the end of the inquiry, as 
Phillipsburg makes clear. 
It is not easy, though, to make economic sense of that 
passage. If commercial and savings banks were in direct 
and vigorous competition, then, in the markets for some 
products (not all, perhaps, but some), savings banks 
were among the relevant suppliers. The Court seems to 
have gotten hung up by insisting on there being only 
one market. And why it should have is something of a 
mystery. Can the Court possibly have thought that 
commercial bank customers buy not the products pro-
vided by banks, but rather somehow or in some sense 
the banks themselves? Or, more generally, that individ-
uals consume not particular products, but companies? 
Indisputably, commercial banks are and have long 
been multiproduct companies. The Connecticut com-
mercial banks of the early 1970s were, and in Con-
necticut and elsewhere those of the present day are. 
Nor can it reasonably be maintained that all of the 
various products of commercial banks are, in the gen-
erally accepted sense of the phrase, close substitutes. 
Some are, but not all. For all bank mergers, the initial 
or working presumption, the null hypothesis, ought 
then to be that there are several lines of commerce or 
several distinct product markets, each with its own 
group of producing companies and its own geographical 
area. In any particular instance, investigation may re-
veal that the commercial banks of the relevant geo-
11 graphical area are without significant competitors. 
Casual observation suggests, though, that the finding 
is likely to be otherwise. Most commercial banks face 
different groups of competitors in each of several mar-
kets. Until very recently, commercial banks outside 
New England competed only with each other in their 
payments-services markets. But with the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
of 1980 (hereinafter, the 1980 Deregulation Act) hav-
ing become a part of the law of the land, commercial 
banks do not have even those markets to themselves. 
Deregulation Act further erodes court decisions 
What the 1980 Deregulation Act did was open all 
payments-services markets to other depository institu-
tions and, most particularly, to savings and loan asso-
ciations. It also permitted other depository institutions 
to lend more freely to individuals than previously they 
could and perhaps, although a certain artfulness may 
be required, to commercial customers as well. And in 
recognition of what Congress did in the act, some have 
advocated simply including savings and loan associa-
tions, credit unions, and, where they exist, savings 
banks among the relevant producers of an undifferen-
tiated something called financial products. Thus, if lia-
bilities (assets) are to be used in calculating market 
shares, then the liabilities (assets) of such nonbank 
depository institutions as there are ought to be included 
in the denominator. That is what has been claimed, and 
making room for those other institutions could be a 
step in the right direction, since to all appearances 
commercial banks do compete with savings and loan 
associations and savings banks in the provision of 
some products. What gives me pause is the thought of 
persisting in the fiction that commercial banks operate 
in just one market, and that competition in the supply 
of a variety of different products is well-approximated 
by how such a heterogeneous aggregate as the total 
liabilities (or assets) is distributed over a predetermined 
class of financial institutions. 
Having several lines of commerce could force ap-
parently strange decisions in bank merger cases. Even 
by the standards of the Justice Department, suitably 
modified, it might be permissible for two large New 
York City banks to merge, but not for two small banks, 
located in some out-of-the-way place, to do so. Imagine 
that there are two banks, would-be merger partners. 
One is far and away the largest in its state; and the 
other, very close in footings to the first, is far and away 
the second largest. Their merger might not seem to be 
in the public interest. But what if both are mostly in 
wholesale banking? The markets for large-denomina-
tion certificates of deposit and large-corporation com-
mercial loans are worldwide, and the two banks, even 
after having merged, may have no appreciable market 
power in them. Because of their emphasis on wholesale 
banking, they may not have any appreciable power in 
local financial-services markets either. 
There is the possible objection that having several 
product markets or lines of commerce would be imprac-
tical. That, however, is easily rebutted. Having several 
lines of commerce may not be all that impractical. 
Consider what Justice Harlan said in his Phillipsburg 
National dissent (p. 381): 
[T]he Court's choice of a product market here can be 
seriously questioned. Certainly a more discriminating 
conclusion concerning the antitrust implication of this 
merger could be made if separate concentration percent-
ages were calculated for each of the important products 
and services provided by appellee banks, and then an 
overall appraisal made of the effect of this merger on 
competition. 
That is from a man who, as a long-time member of the 
Supreme Court, cannot be dismissed as having had no 
feel for what is practical. There is a further point. If it is 
important that the United States have efficient financial 
arrangements, then putting more time and money than 
heretofore into bank merger decisions may be justified. 
If courts could once have legitimately found the 
commercial banks of many geographical areas to be 
without significant competitors, that is most unlikely 
now. Such has been the change wrought by the 1980 
Deregulation Act. Most importantly, the act put sav-
ings and loan associations where Connecticut savings 
banks were at the beginning of 1974. It gave them 
access to certain markets and, I would argue, must 
therefore be regarded as having already altered the 
competitive reality. 
As was noted above, the Supreme Court, in its 
Connecticut National decision, acknowledged the exis-
tence of a recently enacted state statute that changed 
the situation of Connecticut savings banks. Having 
done so, it then conceded that with the changed situa-
tion of the savings banks, the line of commerce might at 
some point in the future have to be expanded (p. 666): 
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We do not say, and Phillipsburg National Bank . . . and 
Philadelphia National Bank ... do not say, that in a case 
involving a merger of commercial banks a court may 
never consider savings banks and commercial banks as 
operating in the same line of commerce, no matter how 
similar their services and economic behavior. At some 
stage in the development of savings banks it will be un-
realistic to distinguish them from commercial banks for 
purposes of the Clayton Act. In Connecticut, that point 
may well be reached when and if savings banks become 
significant participants in the marketing of bank services 
to commercial enterprises. 
We can, of course, interpret "savings banks" as "other 
depository institutions," for it is only the peculiar his-
tory of Connecticut (or New England) that made the 
Court focus on savings banks in the Connecticut 
National case. Even so, it is not clear how much it 
promised for the future. With the last sentence of the 
quoted passage in mind, district courts and our banking 
agencies may for years persist in using commercial 
banking as a line of commerce. How long will it be 
before savings and loan associations (and in the East, 
savings banks) are "significant participants" in the 
markets that have been opened to them? In some parts 
of the country, maybe quite a few years. 
A case can be made, though, that the Supreme 
Court should not have imposed the condition of signifi-
cant participation. The sina qua non of significant 
market power is barriers to entry. If there are no bar-
riers, then, whatever market shares may be, there is no 
significant market power. And what the 1980 Deregu-
lation Act did was remove important legal barriers to 
entry. Now, therefore, all savings and loan associations, 
even those that have not yet become significant partici-
pants in markets that have been opened up to them, are 
relevant for those markets. They are all of decided rele-
vance, for the threat that a savings and loan association, 
already well-established in the area, will move into a 
market is ever so much more real than the threat that 
another commercial bank will open a new branch. 
A Suggestion for Future Bank Merger Cases 
Where a bank merger is at issue, it ought to be accepted 
that there may be several lines of commerce, or several 
different product markets, each with its own geographi-
cal boundaries and group of companies or suppliers, 
actual and potential. That is not to say that in every 
future instance there will be several, for, although that 
is not an unreasonable surmise, the actual circumstan-
ces of each proposed merger must rule. They cannot, 
though, so long as it is simply taken for granted that 
commercial banking is a line of commerce. 
Having to square the Supreme Court's fateful line-
of-commerce finding with their own perceptions of con-
temporary reality, various district courts have said, if 
not in so many words, that commercial banking is and 
is not a line of commerce. Thus, in deciding the 1967 
Crocker-Anglo National Bank case,
9 a district court 
engaged in shading. That is to say, it first calculated the 
market shares of commercial banks, but then adjusted 
the calculated shares to take account of, among other 
things, competition from differently designated financial 
institutions. In its decision in the 1970 First National 
Bank of Maryland case,
1
0
 another district court said 
that commercial banking was the line of commerce, but 
that nonbank competition was to be taken into account 
in appraising the effects of the proposed merger. 
It is bound to be offensive to economists, especially 
those with tidy minds, having to read that commercial 
banking is and is not a line of commerce. Surely, com-
mercial banks either are the only suppliers of the rele-
vant products or they are not. But economists do not 
have to revere the Supreme Court quite as district 
court judges do, or see it as it must appear from down 
the judicial ladder, as a brooding presence. And in 
truth, although detailed analysis is required in every 
instance of a proposed bank merger, there is nothing in 
economics that says that the analysis must come be-
fore market shares have been calculated rather than 
after. Whether before or after is less important than 
whether it is accepted that there may be several lines of 
commerce or product markets. Even after the most 
mindless of starts, a proper appraisal is still possible. 
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